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IMMANUEL KANT: A CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHER? 
Stephen Palmquist 
I begin with a few general suggestions about what it means to be a Christian. I then sum-
marize the new interpretation of Kant as proposing a 'System of Perspectives,' which I have 
set out in greater detail elsewhere. After discussing the important notions of 'criticism,' 
'perspective' and 'system' as they operate in Kant's thought, the bulk of the essay is devoted 
to an assessment of the theological implications of Kant's System, I conclude that, contrary 
to popular opinion, particularly among some Christian theologians, Kant's intentions were 
theologically constructive, and moreover, that his System is thoroughly consistent with the 
Christian perspective. 
One's answer to the question of the Christian character of Kant's Critical philos-
ophy will determine the extent to which one believes his System can serve as an 
adequate philosophical foundation for a Christian world view. My strategy in 
working out an answer to this question will be first to suggest briefly a general 
meaning for "Christian," and then to examine in more detail the general character 
of Kant's philosophy. 
I do not claim to be an authority on knowing what a "Christian" is-indeed, 
there are probably almost as many different definitions of Christianity as there are 
thinking Christians. But I will suggest three categories which, in my opinion, 
should be included in such a definition, A Christian is someone who: (1) has cer-
tain beliefs (e,g" about God and his creative power, about Christ and his redemp-
tive power, and about the Spirit and its communicative power); who (2) seeks to 
obey God (e,g" by heeding the commands presented in the Bible along with those 
"written on his heart"'); and who (3) has some sort of immediate experience of 
God (e,g" in the form of a "conversion," a prayer life, or participation in religious 
ceremonies), The precise content of a particular Christian's beliefs, actions and 
personal experiences will be determined to a large extent by the Christian com-
munity of which he is a member and its way of interpreting the standards set in 
the Bible, 
Given this understanding of "Christian," we must now examine the general char-
acter of Kant's philosophy. In my experience "Kantian" tends to have nearly as 
many different connotations to different people as does "Christian," For most non-
philosophers who know anything about Kant, the word conjures up a few general 
descriptions or caricatures. Those familiar with his theoretical philosophy-for 
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example, with his distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal worlds-
might describe it as an absolute dualism which throws God out the front door, 
only to sneak him in again through the back. Those familiar with his moral 
philosophy might describe him as a rigid, "pharisaical formalist,"2 and cite as 
evidence his tendency to follow such a strict schedule that the people of 
Konigsberg used to set their clocks by his daily comings and goings. 3 And those 
familiar with his religious scruples might describe him as one who could find 
room neither for historical religious beliefs and practices nor for any type of 
personal experience of God; here they might cite the story of how he followed 
the customary procession of professors to the cathedral, only to desert it at the 
doors of the church.4 
One of the first descriptions of Kant I ever heard was one made by a college 
philosophy professor for whom I had much respect. After briefly explaining 
Kant's philosophy and its theological implications, he came out with the following 
bombshell: "No single philosopher," he proclaimed, "has done more damage to 
the Christian religion than Immanuel Kant." This condemnation embedded itself 
in my memory like a steel beam being dropped from the clouds into a vat of 
wet cement. Fortunately, when I actually read Kant for myself several years 
later, the cement had not yet hardened. 
The best way to avoid such a partial treatment of Kant is to attempt to view 
his work as a whole, rather than as a series of isolated theories. This, as we 
shall see, is how he intended us to view most of his philosophical books. Yet 
theologians in particular tend to limit their reading of Kant to his book on religion, 
together, perhaps, with the relevant sections from the three Critiques, which on 
the surface seem to be comprehensible without reading them in their overall 
context. However, by taking this context fully into consideration, we may be 
able to come up with a more positive estimate of Kant's value to theology and 
religion; if so, we will be doing theologians in general and Christian philosophers 
in particular a favour. If it turns out that we can view Kant as a profoundly 
religious and profoundly Christian philosopher, then we will have established a 
much-needed point of contact between the Christian thinker and the non-Christian 
thinker; for the "modem scientific world view" held by the latter is also taken 
more or less directly from Kant. 5 Before attempting to clarify the theological 
and religious implications of Kant's philosophy, I shall make three points with 
regard to how we should interpret his general philosophical method. These points 
fall under the one-word headings: "criticism," "perspective," and "system."6 
Kant's three most famous works are, of course, the Critique of Pure Reason, 
the Critique of Practical Reason, and the Critique of Judgment. In these and 
other systematic philosophical writings Kant employs a method which he calls 
"criticism." Criticism is not, as might first appear, primarily a negative or destruc-
tive activity. On the contrary, it is at least as constructive, if not more constructive, 
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than it is destructive. The goal of Kant's philosophical criticism is to synthesize 
or integrate "dogmatism" and "scepticism"-i.e., to discern the true elements 
in each and dispose only of those elements which make each extreme distasteful 
to its opposite. The dogmatist's conclusions are generally regarded as positive: 
he believes he can demonstrate rationally the truth of numerous metaphysical 
propositions concerning the nature of reality. The sceptic's conclusions, on the 
other hand, are generally regarded as negative: he believes it is impossible to 
demonstrate any metaphysical truths about reality. The Critical philosopher, 
however, maintains that both views have a measure of truth, but are mistaken 
inasmuch as they are both based on the fallacious assumption that the objects 
of our ordinary knowledge and experience are ultimately real objects, or "things 
in themselves." In other words, they both assume that the subject of experience 
in no way influences the objects it perceives. Once it is recognized that we 
necessarily adapt all objects of perception to certain "a priori forms," such as 
space, time, and causality, it becomes clear that what we naturally tend to think 
of as "real objects" are actually best described philosophically as "appearances." 
In other words, in order to be an object of knowledge, a thing in itself must be 
an objectfor us: it must appear to us. Armed with this basic Critical assumption, 
Kant is able to admit that the sceptic is right in saying that we cannot know 
reality as it is in itself, and yet also to admit that the dogmatist is right in saying 
that reality as we know it (i.e., regarded in terms of appearances) is structured 
on a rationally knowable pattern. So much for Kant's special use of "criticism." 
My second interpretive point is that the principle upon which all criticism is 
based is what I call the "Principle of Perspective. " (Although Kant himself does not 
use the German equivalent of the word "perspective," he does make frequent use 
of a number of terms, such as "point of view," "aspect," and "standpoint," which 
are synonymous with the term "perspective" as I use it. 7) A perspective is a way of 
looking at a certain question or set of questions: it acts as a context or a set of 
assumptions on the basis of which such questions can be answered. The primary 
Critical task is to discern the perspective assumed by a given question; for different 
answers can be given depending on what perspective is assumed. Thus, for 
example, both the dogmatist and the sceptic make the fundamental error of failing 
to distinguish between the empirical and the transcendental "perspectives." 
My final interpretive point is that Kant sees the various perspectives he employs 
as being united together in a "System of Perspectives." As a result, the general 
goal which motivates all his Critical endeavours is to elucidate the difference 
between various human perspectives and to demonstrate how they can work 
together in a single, coherent, systematic explanation of human experience. 
Kant's three most general perspectives are the theoretical, as elaborated in the 
Critique of Pure Reason, the practical, as elaborated in the Critique of Practical 
Reason, and the empirical, as elaborated in the Critique of Judgment. To distin-
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guish these from the four subordinate perspectives which operate within each 
(see note 10), I refer to the general perspectives as "standpoints." Each standpoint 
generates its own system of perspectives-which is to say, each primary category 
of philosophical inquiry can itself be divided into secondary categories of inquiry. 
The logical relationship between perspective and standpoints within the context 
of the Critical System is the essence of Kant's infamous "architectonic." 
Having touched briefly upon what I believe are the three most fundamental 
assumptions of Kant's philosophy (see note 6), I shall now proceed to discuss 
in broad outline the theological and religious implications of his System of 
Perspectives. Kant is best known among theologians and philosophers of religion 
for his rejection of the validity of all traditional theoretical arguments for the 
existence of God. (Indeed, this is too often all he is known for!) Although the 
specific criticisms he advances against the proponents of the ontological, the 
cosmological, and the physico-theological, or teleological, arguments differ sig-
nificantly in their details, his general criticism of each focuses on essentially 
the same point: in each case the proponent of such arguments uncritically mixes 
two perspectives which should be kept distinct. The ontological argument, for 
instance, can be regarded as establishing certain knowledge of God's existence 
only by someone who believes that a purely logical treatment of concepts (e.g., 
"God," "perfection," "necessity" and "existence") can eventually establish a 
conclusion concerning the real world (viz. that God really exists). 
But such an assumption could never be accepted by a Kantian, since theoretical 
knowledge concerning the real existence of things can be gained only by com-
bining a concept with what Kant calls an "intuition." He points out in the first 
Critique that, because God is not an object like other objects in the world, he 
cannot be intuited by man. He cannot appear to us in all His glory; or at least, 
if He did, we could never conceptualize what we were intuiting. Therefore, the 
reality of God's existence cannot become an item of theoretical knowledge, no 
matter what type of proof is used. It is precisely because they attempt to establish 
such knowledge-viz. that God exists as a real object (albeit, the most real, or 
most perfect one)-that all theoretical arguments are bound to fail. There is no 
need to discuss here Kant's specific (and well known) criticisms of each argument, 
as long as we recognize that they are all subject to this same general criticism. 
For Kant, then, God's existence is utterly unknowable from the theoretical 
standpoint. It is for this reason, no doubt, that most theologians, particularly 
those who favour the use of such arguments, label Kant as a "deist." But Kant 
himself would have protested loudly, for he always regarded himself as a theist, 
i.e., as one who believes not just in "a God ," but "in a living God. "8 His reason 
for denying the possibility of theoretical knowledge of God's existence is to 
insure that man stays in his proper place, as a believer, not as a knower. For 
"in order to believe in God," he maintains, "it is not necessary to know for 
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certain that God exists. "4 And by this he does not mean to deny the importance 
of upholding a finn conviction of God's existence, but only to point out that, 
however certain we are of God's reality in our lives. our certainty will be of a 
different sort than our empirical certainty that this chair exists, or than our 
transcendental certainty that all objects of our perception appear to us in space 
and time, or than our logical certainty that A =I=-A. 10 Our certainty is different 
because all questions about belief in God belong to the practical perspective. 
To fail to recognize this difference is to open oneself up to a number of dangerously 
misleading illusions about the extent to which man can establish conclusions 
about God's existence. For any attempt to know God's existence theoretically 
implicitly requires "attributing omniscience to yourself. "11 
Such an obviously unChristian position can be avoided, while yet preserving 
a positive role for theoretical theology, once the proper use for theoretical argu-
ments is understood. For Kant's criticisms are not intended so much to close 
the books on all theoretical arguments for the existence of God as to curb the 
pretensions of those who mistakenly believe such arguments can prove (what 
no argument can ever prove) that the transcendent is knowable as such, without 
ever having to become immanent. Kant readily admits that the arguments can 
be used to supplement a person's faith by providing good reasons "to postulate 
the existence of an all-sufficient being"; but he warns that "in presuming so far 
as to say that such a being necessarily exists, we are no longer giving modest 
expression to an admissible hypothesis, but are confidently laying claim to 
apodeictic certainty. "12 Kant believes such arguments "must be allowed to have 
a certain cogency," but only when "the existence of some sort of necessary being 
is taken as granted. "13 
What distresses some theologians about Kant's criticism of traditional rational 
theology is that they believe it will, in the long run, have a detrimental effect 
on the ordinary religious believer. But this belief only reveals a pride on the 
part of such theologians that they are somehow protecting some indispensable 
element of religion which the ordinary religious believer on his own would be 
unable to protect, and would therefore eventually lose to the power of the Enemy. 
What is actually at stake, though, has little if anything to do with the religious 
man's confidence in his God, but everything to do with the theologian's self-image 
as "Protector of the Faith." Indeed, Kant's disapproval of such a "sophisticated" 
self-estimate is explicit and to the point: 
In religion the knowledge of God is properly based on faith alone. 
[So] it is not necessary for this belief [i.e., in God] to be susceptible 
of logical proof .... [S]ophistication is the error of refusing to accept 
any religion not based on a theology which can be apprehended by our 
reason .... Sophistication in religious matters is a dangerous thing; 
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our reasoning powers are limited and reason can err and we cannot 
prove everything. A speculative basis is a very weak foundation for 
religion . . . 14 
Kant's position here is in such obvious agreement with so much of what the 
Bible says on this matter that it astounds me to think about how often his position 
is misunderstood and prematurely rejected. Nowhere does the Bible say that man 
knows God primarily through theoretical argument, even if such argument is 
based upon Holy Scripture itself. Rather the Bible points away from the standpoint 
of theoretical theology and tells us to "Cease striving and know that I am God. "15 
"Yes," says the Psalmist, "I am like a man who does not hear, and in whose 
mouth are no arguments. For I hope in Thee, 0 Lord ... "16 Wickedness stems 
not from denying the possibility of human knowledge, but from denying the 
possibility of divine knowledge: for the wicked man says "How does God know? 
And is there knowledge in the Most High?,,17 All our thoughts "are a mere breath" 
to God, who knows them all and who "teaches man knowledge."ls But God's 
knowledge "is too high, I cannot attain to it."19 Jesus himself tells his disciples 
that they must become like little children in order to enter the Kingdom of 
Heaven. 2o (Little children have faith in their parents even though they may be 
unable to understand the reasons why.) And Paul, of course, knew God through 
an experience, a personal revelation of Christ "in me. "2i Indeed, he sums up the 
Christian position on the nature of our knowledge of God when he says that "to 
know God" really means nothing other than "to be known by God. "22 For the 
condition of "being known by God" is to obey His commandments.23 And on 
this also Paul agrees when he says: "If anyone supposes that he knows anything, 
he has not yet known as he ought to know; but if anyone loves God, he is 
known by Him."24 Thus our knowledge of God is not theoretical, but empirical 
(through our immediate relationship with God) or practical (through our obedience 
of the law which God places in our hearts25). 
If Kant follows the Biblical approach by refusing to place his trust in the 
traditional theoretical arguments for God's existence, then of what use, if any, 
is the theoretical standpoint in respect to one's theological beliefs? Kant's answer 
to this question is too complex to be treated adequately here, in the context of 
such a broad outline of his views. It will suffice merely to point out three ways 
in which he develops a radically positive theology, one which is intended to 
reap all the benefits of traditional rational theology, but without succumbing to 
unChristian pretensions. 26 First, in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant proposes 
his theory of God as a regulative "idea of reason." Now this is in no way intended 
to imply that God is nothing but a fictional idea invented by man, much as the 
mathematician uses imaginary numbers even though he knows they are not real; 
rather it simply expresses the view that God's existence, when considered from 
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the theoretical standpoint, is bound to be "postulated problematically"27 as what 
might nowadays be called an "explanatory hypothesis." Once our right to use the 
concept of God is established theoretically by demonstrating that His existence can-
not be disproved, we are free not only to fill out the concept of God by examining 
His attributes from the theoretical standpoint (as Kant does in his Lectures on 
Philosophical Theology), but also to use the concept from other, nontheoretical 
standpoints. Thus, the second aspect of Kant's positive theology is an attempt to 
justify this postulate from a practical, or moral, standpoint in the Critique of Prac-
tical Reason. His argument, in a nutshell, is that if a moral agent is to think consis-
tently about the implications of his attempt to act morally, he must admit either that 
there exists a God who will eventually reward the person who acts morally for 
the right motive, or else that morality itself is an irrational form of activity. 28 
The third aspect of Kant's positive theology is established in the Critique of 
Judgment, where he reintroduces the teleological argument in its proper context, 
as a postulate which arises not out of theoretical argumentation about the world, 
but directly out of our experience of beauty and purpose. 
Perhaps I have said enough about the essentially positive thrust of Kant's 
theology. His theological views seem to me to be thoroughly consistent with 
Christianity; but what about his views on religion? Here surely to be a Kantian 
must involve some claims which the Christian cannot accept. For in his book, 
Religion Within the Bounds of Bare Reason, Kant gives the impression of being 
quite unorthodox in much of what he says. One of the reasons for this general 
impression of Kant's philosophy of religion is that it has too often been taken 
up into the theologies of those who interpret Kant too simplistically. A good 
example is Ritschl, who, as one commentator puts it, 
was compelled to grapple with secular philosophy to a sufficient degree 
to show that Kantian epistemology was entirely consistent with Lutheran 
Christianity. 
But ... the normal man in Kant's critique of pure reason has little 
taste for the element of mystery in religion and seduced Ritschl to deny 
that mystery which slumbers in every human breast ... 29 
Such seduction can result only from a partial acquaintance with, or an inadequate 
understanding of, what Kant was trying to accomplish. For his overall System 
of Perspectives is intended not to deny such mystery to the thinking man, but 
to secure it against the illusions of dogmatic approaches which try to remove 
such mystery, and of sceptical approaches which regard everything as mysterious. 
As a result, when he comes to apply his Critical System to religion his conclusions 
are bound to seem to the sceptic to be too dogmatic and to the dogmatist to be 
too sceptical. But it turns out that many of the views expressed in his book on 
religion, which admittedly seem less than Christian at first sight, tum out upon 
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closer investigation to be profound explanations of the rational meaning lying 
behind basic Christian doctrines. Kant wrote this book, after all, not only as a 
defence of the Christian religion, but as a philosophical explanation of what 
religion generally is. When this is taken into account, it becomes more clear 
just how consistent his approach is with traditional Christian doctrine. 
Throughout his works Kant's comments on religion are usually purposefully 
limited to the practical standpoint, so that he often ends up explaining (theoretical) 
theological doctrines or (empirical) religious experiences in practical (i.e., moral) 
terms. However, he never claims that the practical standpoint is the only legitimate 
context for interpreting such doctrines or experiences. When, for instance, he 
analyses the practical value of prayer as an inner stimulus, intended "to induce 
in us a moral disposition,"30 he is not precluding the legitimacy of also regarding 
the immediate experience of prayer as a form of communion with God. Indeed, 
Kant himself reveals his awareness of this other perspective on prayer when he 
makes comments such as that God's "all-seeing eye penetrates into our innermost 
souls and reads our thoughts,"31 or that prayer "should fan into flames the cinders 
of morality in the inner recesses of our heart."32 Kant was admittedly highly 
suspicious of extremes such as religious "fanaticism" and "clericalism." But this 
should not blind us to the fact that he always kept an open mind with regard to 
the possibility of an irrational (or arational) experience of the supernatural, such 
as that in which he shows considerable interest in his much-neglected Dreams 
of a Spirit-Seer (1766). Kant's rejection of extremes does not entail a rejection 
of a balanced attitude towards the possibility of supernatural experiences. 
In the last few years of his life Kant was working on a book which he believed 
would be the crowning work of his Critical System. Unfortunately, he never 
completed it; but the notes he left" make it clear that in this final work he was 
attempting to get to the very heart of man's religious experience. He consistently 
refers to God as a "Person," a practice which was by no means common in his 
day;34 and he elaborates on the way God relates to man through practical reason, 
which, as he had already stated elsewhere, "may be considered as the immediate 
declaration and voice of God, by which he giveth a meaning to the letter of his 
creation. "35 Comments such as that God (the "knower of hearts"36) is "closer to 
us than breathing and nearer than hands or feet"37suggest that, here at the end 
of his life, Immanuel Kant may have been trying to demonstrate that "God with 
us" belongs at the very centre of his System. Most interpreters regard such 
proposals as a subjectivist contradiction of the key principles of the Critical 
philosophy. However, when his philosophical task is understood in terms of a 
System of Perspectives, it becomes apparent that he is here grappling with the 
most difficult subject for philosophers (along with many theologians) to deal 
with-viz. immediate experience-and that in adopting this new perspective he 
is in no way ruling out the legitimacy of the others. 
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So far, I have only scratched the surface of the theological and religious 
implications of Kant's System of Perspectives. 3< For example, I have said nothing 
about many of Kant's specific theories which tend to encourage Christian theolo-
gians to reject his philosophy, such as his theory that the law of causality always 
holds true in the phenomenal world (thus apparently denying the possibility of 
miracles), or his conception of historical matters such as Jesus' resurrection, or 
of theological matters such as Christ's redemptive activity. In my opinion these 
and other difficult questions can be answered without straying from Kant's own 
principles and yet without compromising anything essential with respect to our 
Christian faith. But in any case, the limited extent of my treatment here does 
not affect my answer to the question posed at the beginning. For in its most 
general sense, a "Kantian" is not someone who defends and uses Kant's own 
terminology, or who agrees with the most important conclusions of his mul-
tifarious (and often perplexing) arguments. Rather a Kantian is someone who 
philosophizes in the spirit of Kant: someone who sets for himself the task of 
always discerning the perspective he is assuming before reaching his conclusions, 
who sees the limitations of human knowledge implied by such Critical thinking, 
and who accepts his ability to understand what he can without striving to under-
stand that which he cannot. 
Now, as Kant himself puts it, all this requires the confession that "the inscrut-
able wisdom through which we exist is not less worthy of veneration in respect to 
what it denies us than in [respect to] what it has granted. "19 My conclusion, there-
fore, is that, far from doing cataclysmic damage to the Christian religion, as it 
admittedly does on a traditional interpretation such as Ritschl's, we should regard 
Kant's philosophical System as he intended us to: that is, as putting forward a 
coherent, rational explanation of the world in which man has been placed-an 
explanation which requires us humbly to confess our ignorance of God's own per-
spective, freely to obey the transcendent law we find working within our breast, 
and silently to rest in the awesome grace of his redemptive power. If indeed the 
Christian is someone who seeks to believe in God, obey Him, and have a personal 
relationship with Him, then it seems not only legitimate, but compulsory, to view 
Kant as having developed a radically Christian philosophy. 
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